We investigate analyst forecasts in a unique setting, the natural gas storage market, and study the contributions of analysts in facilitating price discovery in futures markets. Using a high frequency database of analyst storage forecasts, we show that the market appears to strongly condition expectations regarding a weekly storage release on the analyst forecasts and beyond that of a number of statistical-based models. Further, we find evidence that the market looks through the reported consensus estimate of analyst forecasts and places differential emphasis on the forecasts of analysts according to their prior performance. Furthermore, it appears that the market focuses on analysts' long term rather than recent forecasting performance.
Introduction
The role of analyst forecasts in the price discovery process is a crucial area of financial economics research. We investigate a unique setting for examining the role of analysts as informationgathering agents and as facilitators of price discovery-the market for natural gas. Foremost as a fundamental determinant of natural gas prices is "gas in storage". In recognition of its importance, the market has evolved an interesting set of mechanisms to facilitate the flow of information regarding the supply of gas in storage.
1 Beginning in 1994, an industry trade group first initiated a weekly survey of U.S. storage facility operators to assess supplies held. This information is prepared into a "storage report," which is then revealed to the market through a closely followed public release. In turn, an analyst community emerged who provide forecasts each week of the volume to be reported. To facilitate the public dissemination of these analyst forecasts, in April 1997 a major market information vendor (Bloomberg) began soliciting forecasts from analysts.
Bloomberg computes a consensus estimate and, together with the individual analyst forecasts, releases this information over the newswire in advance of the release of the storage report.
We construct a complete and survivor-bias-free database of these analyst forecasts beginning with the inception of the first Bloomberg release in April 1997 and extending through August 2005. Using a rational expectations framework, we examine how the market incorporates these analyst forecasts into prices. We analyze the futures price reaction to the release of the weekly storage number and first find that the market appears to strongly condition expectations on the Bloomberg analyst forecasts and beyond that of a number of statistical and historical-based approaches commonly referenced in the trade. 2 In these cases, we find that the futures price exhibits higher levels of response to the surprise component of the announcements, that such specifications have superior J-test explanatory power 3 , and that these results hold across various 1 Gas in storage refers to reserves held in aquifers, salt caverns, and depleted oil and gas reservoirs. While natural gas production is relatively constant throughout the year, its consumption is extremely variable. Hence, gas in storage plays a pivotal role in smoothing resulting supply and demand imbalances. It serves as a near market source for supplementing pipeline capacities, provides a backup reserve in the event of wellhead disruptions, and increases efficiency by reducing the need to build additional production facilities to accommodate periods of high demand. Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2006) discuss the role of gas in storage as a means for managing volume risk. 2 For a discussion of the role of storage and its relation to spot and futures prices see, for example, Working (1949) , Brennan (1958) , Telser (1958) , Cootner (1967) , Fama and French (1987) , and Ng and Pirrong (1994) . 3 The J-test provides a means for examining the relative explanatory power of competing non-nested models.
information environments. We then explore whether and how the market, when conditioning expectations on analyst forecasts, differentiates among analysts according to their forecasting ability. We find evidence that the market does indeed look through the reported consensus estimate of analyst forecasts and places differential emphasis on the forecasts of analysts according to their prior performance. Furthermore, it appears that the market focuses on analysts'
long-term rather than recent forecasting performance.
Our setting contrasts with that typically observed in studies of equity analysts. First, storage reports and analyst forecasts are produced with high frequency (weekly) as compared to, for example, the quarterly release of earnings statements, thus increasing the power of our tests.
Second, the individual gas analyst forecasts are not revised, but Bloomberg may release updates due to late arriving forecasts, and these will typically occur within a day or even hours of the initial release. Together, these factors reduce the timeliness of forecast problem discussed in O' Brien (1990) , Brown (1991) , and Sinha, Brown, and Das (1997) who argue that forecast accuracy improves with additional time to analyze information, because a richer information set can be incorporated into the forecast. Third, the storage event we analyze is notably different in that the variable being forecasted has, in a sense, already transpired (i.e., the storage level as of 9:00am the prior Friday). This contrasts, for example, to an earnings number in which corporate and macroeconomic events affecting the actual earnings number typically continue to transpire as analyst forecasts are prepared. As a result, these events may prompt forecast revisions whereas they would have no impact on the weekly storage forecasts. Fourth, the above factors also serve to reduce the window of opportunity for analysts to herd upon the forecasts of leading analysts. 4 Finally, the alleged conflicts of interest that pressure equity analysts to provide biased or optimistic forecasts due to firms' underwriting relations and brokerage activities are not present in the case of gas analysts. Hong and Kubik (2003) find that brokerage houses reward equity analysts who provide optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus forecast and those analysts enjoy more favorable job prospects. Our conversations with gas analysts reveal that their activities are typically provided as a service to clients who are mainly interested in accuracy.
Our investigation also entails two sidebars that create interesting information environments for analyzing market behavior. First, gas in storage is highly cyclical and involves two calendar periods during which supply and demand fundamentals alternate in importance and thus present differing challenges to analysts. During the "injection season" (April to October), storage typically accumulates since demand is lower during the warmer months and new inventories are being added in advance of the next winter heating season. During the "withdrawal season"
(November to March), inventories are drawn down due to high consumption demand in the winter heating season. Demand shocks are mainly weather driven and are larger in magnitude and less predictable than supply shocks, which are typically technology driven. Hence, weekly storage changes are typically greater and more difficult to predict during the withdrawal season. We find that analyst forecasts are indeed less accurate and more dispersed during the demand driven withdrawal season than during the supply driven injection season.
Second, a major change in responsibility for the conduct of the weekly survey took place during the period of our investigation. The survey was originated in January 1994 by the American Gas Association (AGA), the industry trade group. However, in May 2002, the U.S.
Department of Energy's "Energy Information Administration" (EIA) assumed responsibility from the AGA for conducting the survey. The EIA implemented several changes to the survey procedures with the intention to reduce noise and produce more accurate estimates. We find that analyst accuracy improved and forecast dispersion decreased following the EIA takeover.
5
Research has shown that fundamental factors such as macroeconomic and other information releases affecting supply and demand play an important role in the price discovery of futures prices. For example, Roll (1984) examines orange juice futures, Harvey and Huang (1991) examines currency futures, Ederington and Lee (1993) study the reaction of interest rate and currency futures, and Linn and Zhu (2004) examine natural gas futures. Our research takes this analysis one step further and builds on the studies of the role of individual analysts such as those of Stickel (1992) and the recent works of Hautsch and Hess (2004) and Chen and Jiang (2006) . Stickel (1992) finds that the market places greater emphasis on analysts having strong reputations (i.e., Institutional Investor's All-Americans) by showing that abnormal returns were higher following large upward revisions in earnings forecasts by All-American analysts than those of other analysts. Our study looks at the price reaction to the actual information release rather than when the analyst forecast is released.
Chen and Jiang (2006) study whether the public earnings forecasts of equity analysts reflect Bayesian weighting with respect to the consensus forecasts of other analysts and their own 5 The Appendix describes the AGA and EIA survey procedures and discusses events surrounding the changeover.
private information. They find evidence that analysts place higher (lower) weight on their own private estimate than the Bayesian weight would suggest when their private estimate is more (less) favorable than the consensus forecast. We investigate the next aspect of the analysts' role whether the market over-weights or places differential weights on the forecasts of various analysts. Hautsch and Hess (2004) study the reaction of T-Bond futures prices to the monthly employment releases. Using information regarding analyst consensus and dispersion estimates of monthly employment, they find evidence that the market reacts to the Bayesian update of the released statistic rather than the actual number itself. Since our database contains, in addition to consensus estimates, details on individual analyst forecasts we are able to go one step further and investigate whether the market looks through the consensus forecast and reacts differentially to the forecast of individual analysts.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we describe the Bloomberg analyst survey procedures and the analyst forecast, storage report, and futures data. In section 3 we describe the various analyst performance measures and report results of the various univariate tests of analyst forecast performance. In section 4 we describe our methods for analyzing the futures price reaction to the storage announcements under various conditioning models of expectations. Section 5 presents results for comparing the Bloomberg consensus estimate versus a number of statistical based forecasts commonly used in the industry. Similarly, section 6 compares the Bloomberg estimate against a number of strategies wherein the futures market is assumed to assign different weights to the analyst forecasts. Section 7 concludes.
Data Description

The Bloomberg survey and analyst forecast data
Many firms who operate, make markets, or provide risk management services in the energy sector employ market analysts responsible for developing forecasts of the weekly storage report. 6 These forecasts are used internally by the firms for strategic planning and trading purposes, and externally for the benefit of clients. 7 In April 1997, Bloomberg asked a group of firms to 6 The information in this section is based in large part on our conversation with Andrew Stewart of Bloomberg who held key responsibility for the analyst survey. 7 Attesting to the importance of the storage report, the NYMEX and ICAP in 2004 joined to offer OTC options on the weekly gas storage change to assist market participants in managing exposures to the impact of the weekly report. Also, there have been a number of OTC derivative transactions using swap structures that settle based on numbers reported in the weekly storage report.
participate in a weekly analyst survey. The first survey, containing the forecasts of seven analysts, was released on April 16, 1997 and the survey has since been regularly conducted to date. The sample of firms participating in the survey has changed in composition due to firms entering and others departing. Firms will sometimes contact Bloomberg and request to be included in the survey while other firms have stopped providing a forecast, been acquired or merged, or exited the business. For a brief period in [2003] [2004] , the number of surveyed analysts was "capped" at 20
with firms occasionally placed on a waiting list, but subsequently the number was allowed to grow.
There are no formal criteria used to decide which firms are to be added, but a firm must have a good reputation.
The Bloomberg survey procedure is conducted as follows. By Tuesday of each week, a
Bloomberg employee calls each analyst or receives an email containing the analyst's forecast.
Many analysts provide a range for their estimated change in storage. In these cases, Bloomberg uses the midpoint of the range. Bloomberg then computes a "consensus estimate" based on the arithmetic average of the analyst forecasts. The first Bloomberg estimate of each week is typically prepared and released on Tuesday morning when at least one half of the analysts have reported.
Updates are released if additional forecasts are received.
We collect all Bloomberg releases pertaining to their weekly analyst survey from the survey's inception on April 16, 1997 through August 25, 2005. This produced 437 weeks of forecast data. From each release, we record its time, the name and forecast of each participating firm, and the Bloomberg computed "consensus forecast." Table 1 presents a listing of all 38 firms providing forecasts at any time during the study period. For each firm we report the time period over which forecasts were made, the total number of weekly forecasts, and the number of forecasts broken down by AGA version EIA periods and by injection versus withdrawal seasons. Across all firms, we obtain a total of 5,358 analyst forecasts of which 2,012 are from the AGA period and 3,346 from the EIA period. Forecasts are divided between the injection and withdrawal seasons at 2,140 and 3,218, respectively. Fig. 1 provides a weekly plot of the number of analysts providing forecasts throughout our sample period. In the early part of the sample period through year-end 2000 the number of participating analysts was relatively stable and generally ranged from five to seven. Subsequently, the number of analysts grew steadily and increased to as many as 25 during the latter period.
AGA and EIA Storage Report Data
We collect all AGA and EIA weekly storage report volume data spanning the period of January 5, October and from November to March, respectively, can be clearly seen.
Futures Data
We obtain futures price data from TickData, which include all price ticks (denoted by price and time stamp) for each day of our analyst sample period of April 16, 1997 16, through August 25, 2005 Given that the natural gas futures contract has monthly maturities, we concentrate on the nearby contract that we continuously roll over. Further, given that the window of time during which storage reports were released varied up to 15 minutes, we calculate 15-minute returns throughout the trading day. We also compute off-business hour returns measured from each trading day's close to the next day's open.
Analyst performance measures and summary statistics
We next describe the various measures of analyst performance that we use in our analysis, taken from the earnings forecast literature. We then present summary statistics on the performance of each of the 38 analyst firms, as well as statistics that compare differences in analyst performance between the AGA and EIA regimes, and between the injection and withdrawal seasons.
Individual analyst performance measures
For each analyst in a given week, we compute the following three alternative measures:
This measure is the absolute value (measured in Bcf) of the difference between analyst i's forecasted change in storage in week t and the actual announced storage change, computed as follows:
where AFE i,t is the analyst forecast error of analyst i in week t.
(ii) Standardized analyst forecast error (SAFE): Because gas in storage exhibits strong cyclicality as the market moves through seasons of injection and withdrawal, analyst performance can be affected by current storage levels. Thus, we standardize (i.e., deflate) the analyst forecast error (AFE) by the level of storage as follows:
where SAFE i,t is defined as the standardized analyst forecast error of analyst i in week t, and STOR t is the actual storage level for week t.
(iii) Scaled analyst accuracy (ACCUR): To facilitate comparison of analysts between peers within a given week and across time, we compute a scaled accuracy performance measure that assesses an analyst's performance in a given week relative to that week's other participating analysts.
Following Clement and Tse (2005), we compute this measure as follows:
where ACCUR i,t is defined as the scaled analyst accuracy for analyst i in week t, and Max t (AFE i,t ) and Min t (AFE i,t ) are, respectively, the largest and smallest analyst forecast error in week t. This measure thus assigns a value of 1 to each week's most accurate analyst, a value of 0 to the least accurate analyst, and intermediate values within this range to the remaining analysts. As a relative measure of forecasting accuracy, ACCUR offers advantages due to its scalar nature. Economic interpretations should, however, be made with caution. To illustrate, a value of 0.60 for a particular analyst can be loosely interpreted as follows: given the computed range of forecast errors for a given week, on average, the analyst is 60 percent accurate.
We compute for all 38 analyst firms their mean weekly performance and the corresponding ranking using each of the three performance measures (ACCUR, AFE, and SAFE). As shown in 
where DISP t is the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts made during week t, and SDISP t is the standardized dispersion.
Using these weekly aggregate measures, we next conduct univariate tests of whether the different information environments present in (a) the AGA versus EIA reporting regimes, and (b) the injection versus withdrawal seasons relate to analyst performance.
(a) AGA versus EIA
The EIA assumed responsibility for the survey beginning with the report released on May 9, 2002 at which time they implemented several changes intended to produce a less noisy estimate.
We hypothesize that analyst forecasts during the EIA period should be more accurate and less dispersed. As we discuss in the Appendix, the EIA introduced a stratified sampling design to minimize sampling error, expanded the number of surveyed firms and thus the percentage of the gas storage market covered, and modified procedures for estimating volumes held by non-sampled storage operators. The EIA also required mandatory reporting whereas with the AGA reporting was voluntary. Finally, being that the EIA is a federal agency, storage operators should take greater care in ensuring the accuracy of their reported volumes. The EIA-912 survey form includes a warning that it is a federal crime to make any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement.
We present in Panel A of 
Methods for assessing analyst contribution
We contend that gas analysts play an important role in the discovery of natural gas futures prices as they provide the market with important information regarding storage inventories. To investigate this contribution, we use a framework based on the rational expectation hypothesis (REH) as developed in Muth (1961) and later refined by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Grossman (1980) . The REH has been applied to a number of markets for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic and survey announcements. For example, Roley (1983, 1985) apply the REH to equity markets, Mishkin (1981 Mishkin ( , 1982 apply it to markets for interest rates, and Colling and Irwin (1990) and Mann and Dowen (1998) apply the REH to futures markets.
Using this approach we analyze the extent to which the market conditions expectations on the Bloomberg analyst forecast (as compared to competing models of forecasted storage changes)
by examining the futures price reaction to both the expected and unexpected (surprise) components of the weekly gas storage report. Our basic specification for inspecting the futures market's reaction to the release of the report is as follows:
where R t is the futures return ("announcement return") spanning the 15-minute time interval containing the announcement of the weekly storage release during week t, Expected t is the market's expected storage change for week t, and Surprise t is the unanticipated or surprise component of the week t storage change measured as the difference between the actual and expected change as follows: Surprise t = Actual t -Expected t .
Models of expected storage changes
To quantify the variable Expected t in Eq. (8), we use both the Bloomberg consensus estimate and a number of alternative statistical-based approaches commonly used in the industry to estimate the expected weekly storage change. The various models we employ for conditioning expectations are as follows.
(1) Bloomberg: In this framework, the market is assumed to condition its expectation of the weekly storage change to equal the Bloomberg consensus analyst forecast.
(2) Naive0: The market expects no change in weekly storage from that of the prior week.
(3) Naive1W: The market expects the weekly storage change to equal that change observed during the immediate prior week.
(4) Naive1Y: The market expects the weekly storage change to equal the previous-year, sameweek change in actual storage.
(5) Naive5Y: The market expects the weekly storage change to equal the previous 5-year, sameweek average change in actual storage.
(6) ARIMA: The market expects the weekly storage change to equal the out-of-sample ARIMA forecast. ARIMA forecasts are made using SAS time-series forecasting procedures with each week's forecast based on all available storage data from January 1994 up through the prior week.
We test several ARIMA models including models using 52 weekly seasonal dummies to capture seasonality. We select the model with the highest R-squared to make the storage forecast.
Full regression specification and coefficient interpretation
As noted earlier, we observe various structural and procedural changes during the time frame of our investigation spanning the 437-week period of April 16, 1997 to August 25, 2005. To capture their potential influence on announcement returns, we include additional variables into the basic specification given in Eq. (8). During the first 268 weeks, the AGA had responsibility for the weekly storage report while the EIA held the responsibility for the remaining 169 weeks. Further, during the first 151 weeks of the AGA period, the AGA released its storage report after the close of futures trading. For the remaining weeks of the AGA period and for the entire EIA period, the report was released during normal futures trading hours. We also distinguish between weeks during the withdrawal season and those during the injection season.
To control for these effects, we define the following dummy variables: AgaBus t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the week t's survey report is released during the AGA, business hour period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. AgaOff t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the survey report is released during the AGA, off-business hour period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. SeasWd t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the survey report is released during the withdrawal season, and is equal to 0 otherwise. We modify Eq. (8) to capture these effects within the intercept and slope terms as follows: 
We interpret the coefficients in the above expression as follows:
Intercept coefficients: α 0 is the average announcement return for the EIA, injection season era when both the "surprise" (i.e., unexpected) and "expected" storage change variables are equal to 0; α 1 is the incremental announcement return during the AGA, business hour era; α 2 is the incremental announcement return during the AGA, off-business hour era; and α 3 is the incremental announcement return during the withdrawal season.
Storage surprise coefficients: β 0 is the incremental market reaction per unit of unexpected storage change for the EIA, injection season era; β 1 is the incremental market reaction per unit of unexpected storage change during the AGA, business hour era; β 2 is the incremental market reaction per unit of unexpected storage change during the AGA, offbusiness hour era; and β 3 is the incremental market reaction per unit of unexpected storage change during the withdrawal season.
Expected storage coefficients: γ 0 is the incremental market reaction per unit of the expected storage change for the EIA, injection season era; γ 1 is the incremental market reaction per unit of the expected storage change during the AGA, business hour era; γ 2 is the incremental market reaction per unit of the expected storage change during the AGA, offbusiness hour era; and γ 3 is the incremental market reaction per unit of the expected storage change during the withdrawal season.
With regard to the various β coefficients, we expect the futures price reaction to be inversely related to the storage surprise. That is, a greater (smaller) than expected storage change should lead to a lower (higher) futures price. Further, we expect this price reaction to be stronger during the injection season than during the withdrawal season. During withdrawal, storage surprises will be mainly demand-driven due to weather, thus producing temporary shifts in the demand curve. During injection, storage surprises will be mainly supply-driven and related to the technology of storage, thus shifting the supply curve. Given that the short-term demand curve for natural gas should be highly inelastic and more inelastic than the supply curve, a supply shock will produce a larger equilibrium price change than the same size demand shock. Thus, for the estimated coefficients β 0 and β 3 , we predict β 0 < 0, β 3 > 0, and β 0 +β 3 < 0.
The coefficients β 1 and β 2 capture the incremental sensitivity relative to the base case (injection seasons during the EIA period) of announcement returns during the AGA business and non-business hour periods, respectively. We hypothesize that β 1 > 0 and β 2 > 0. We expect the estimate of β 1 to be positive if storage announcements during the AGA period contain more noise and are thus more difficult to forecast, thereby reducing the responsiveness of the futures price.
We expect the estimate of β 2 to be positive reflecting that overnight returns will embody other information effects, thus causing announcement returns to be overall less sensitive.
With respect to the various γ coefficients associated with the expected storage variables, we expect their estimated values to be generally insignificant as the market should incorporate expectations into prices. That is, if markets are efficient, price should not react to the expected component of the announced storage change.
Results: Bloomberg versus alternative models
Before analyzing the extent to which the market conditions expectations on the Bloomberg analyst forecast, we first compare the overall accuracy of the Bloomberg forecast to that of each of the five alternative forecasting models. We tests for differences in the time series of forecast errors using the pair-wise test procedure described in Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) . Following this we examine the future market reaction to the storage report announcement when conditioning on each of the respective forecasting models.
Mean square error comparisons
Using the time series of forecast errors (e.g., the differences between the actual and forecasted storage change) taken from each model over the 437-week sample period, we compute the associated root mean squared error (RMSE), mean error (ME), and mean absolute error (MAE).
In addition, we compute the same error measures where all forecast errors are first scaled or standardized by the actual storage level for the week, which we denote as SRMSE, SME, and SMAE, respectively. These statistics are reported in Panel A of We test whether the Bloomberg mean squared error (MSE) is statistically lower than that based on each of the other models using the pair-wise test procedure described in Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) . 9 This procedure involves estimating the following equation using forecast errors taken from the pair of models being compared:
where FE B,t is the forecast error based on the Bloomberg forecast during week t, FE i,t is the forecast error taken from alternative model i during week t, and the ME B and ME i are the mean forecast errors for the Bloomberg and alternative model i, respectively. The intuition behind Eq.
(10) is as follows. The MSE can be decomposed into two terms: a sample variance (of the errors) and the square of the mean error. Then, for any two models, the difference between the variances can be written as the covariance between the error differences and error sums. Thus, to test for the equality of the MSE's, one tests for the equality of the mean errors and for the equality of the variances (i.e., that the covariance is equal to zero). The test that ω i,1 equals zero is a test for the equality of the mean errors, while the test that ω i,2 equals zero is a test for the equality of variances (or that the covariance is zero).
We repeat the estimation of the Eq. (10) using the time series of Bloomberg forecast errors paired each time with a set of forecast errors taken from one of the 5 alternative models. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the MSE's from the two paired models while the alternative hypothesis is that the Bloomberg MSE is lower. Specifically, for the null hypothesis, we test whether the estimates of the coefficients ω i,1 and ω ι,2 are both equal to zero. For the alternative hypothesis, we require that both estimates be non-negative and at least one estimate be positive. If one estimate is negative, but insignificant, then the other estimate is required to be significantly positive based on a one-tailed t-test. If both estimates are positive, then a two-tailed F test is to be used. 10 9 Hafer, Hein, and MacDonald (1992) illustrate this procedure in their tests of the relative accuracy of alternative models for forecasting U.S. Treasury-bill forward rates. 10 The described procedure works as explained only if the mean errors of both forecasts are positive. In cases in which either or both of the mean errors are negative, twice the mean error of that forecast (or twice the mean errors of both forecasts) is subtracted from the dependent variable. After this adjustment, the coefficient ω 1 will then describe the difference in the absolute values of the mean errors of the two compared models.
Our results based on using the standardized forecast errors from each model are presented in Panel B of Table 4 . 11 For each of the model comparisons, all estimates of ω ι,2 are significantly positive. In addition, none of the estimates of ω i,1 are significantly less than zero, while some estimates are significantly positive. Also, in all cases the Wald statistics are significantly different from zero. Together, these findings support the alternative hypothesis that the Bloomberg consensus forecast provides a lower mean forecast error than that of each of the alternative statistical-based forecasting models.
Analysis of futures price reaction
To the extent that the market conditions expectations on information contained in the Bloomberg analyst consensus forecast beyond that provided in the alternative five models, we expect to observe the following when performing the various estimations of Eq. (9). First, the futures price reaction to the "surprise" or unexpected component of the storage announcement (as measured by the estimates of the β coefficients) should exhibit higher levels of responsiveness in the "Bloomberg model" than those of the other five models. Second, the futures price reaction to the expected component of the storage announcement (as measured by the estimates of the various γ coefficients) should be insignificant since under the rational expectations hypothesis the market should incorporate expectations into prices. Third, the regression specification based on the Bloomberg forecast should have a higher overall level of explanatory power than the other models. We investigate each of these in turn.
Inspection of coefficients
After first standardizing all variables (except dummy variables) by prevailing storage levels, we estimate Eq. (9) using data taken over the 437-week period of April 16, 1997 16, to August 25, 2005 for each model specification. 12 Our results are reported in Table 5 . Consider first the estimates of the various β coefficients. As discussed previously, β 0 captures the futures price reaction to the unexpected or surprise component of the storage announcement during the base case scenario, i.e., 11 All regression estimations have been corrected for autocorrelation and for heteroscedasticity using the "jackknife" heteroscedastic consistent-covariance matrix estimator method (HCCME). We have also used an AR(4)-GARCH(1,1) procedure and found qualitatively similar results. 12 Nine weeks were omitted from the analysis during which storage reports were released on holidays or during nonbusiness hours of days immediately prior to a holiday, thus leaving 428 weeks of observations. In addition, we estimate each specification using an AR-GARCH(1,1) procedure where the AR structure is first identified using the backstep method.
storage report releases during an injection season within the EIA period. As predicted, for all models, the estimated β 0 coefficients are significantly negative. However, the estimate of β 0 from Bloomberg-based model (Bloom) is by far the largest with an estimated coefficient of -1.3617 (tvalue of -5.79). We interpret this estimate to indicate that a 1% storage surprise will result in a We further note that only for the Bloomberg model is this value of β 0 +β 3 significantly less than zero.
For the coefficients β 1 and β 2 (the incremental returns during the AGA business and nonbusiness periods, respectively), we expect both estimated values to be positive indicating that futures prices are overall less sensitive to surprises during the AGA period as compared to during the EIA period. In support of this conjecture, only in model 1 (Bloom) is the estimated coefficient β 2 significantly positive. The estimate for β 1 in model 1 has a positive sign, but it is not significant.
Next, consider the estimates of the γ coefficients. We find in the Model 1 (Bloom) results that all estimates are insignificantly different from zero, supporting the rational expectations hypothesis that prices should not react to the release of expected information. Furthermore, we observe in each of the other model specifications (except for Naive5Y) that there are instances of significant values for the estimated coefficients of γ.
J-test results for differences in model explanatory power
We observe in Table 5 that the specification using the Bloomberg forecast (model 1) as the conditioning variable for expectations has the highest level of explanatory power with a total R 2 value of 0.225, followed by a R 2 value of 0.150 for model 3 (Naive1W) and a value of 0.133 for model 5 (Naive5Y). To further explore whether the Bloomberg consensus analyst forecast provides information beyond that contained in the various statistical-based forecasts (and viceversa), we conduct the following J-test procedure for testing between non-nested regression models (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) and McAleer (1995) . First, assume that the specification (i.e., Eq. 9) based on the Bloomberg forecast can be written as follows:
and that a competing specification based on an alternative forecasting approach is written as
where X and Y are the vectors of explanatory variables and δ and θ are the vectors of regression coefficients based on the Bloomberg (B) and an alternative (A) forecasting model, respectively.
Next, we estimate equations (11) and (12) (1 )
(1 )
Our null hypothesis is that Bloomberg model fits the data better than each of the paired alternative forecasting models. In this case, we require the estimate of the λ A coefficient to be insignificantly different from zero and the estimate of λ B to be significantly different from zero. If the alternative model fits the data better than the Bloomberg model, then one would expect the reverse, that is, the value of the λ B coefficient should be insignificantly different from zero and the value of the λ A coefficient should be significantly different from zero. If estimates of both λ A and λ B are significantly different from zero, then both models provide a degree of information not found in the other model. If both estimates are insignificant, then both models provide similar information and neither model can be said to be superior to the other.
We present the J-test results in Table 6 in which we present the estimates of the coefficients λ A and λ B . For all regressions based on Eq. (13), the estimated values of λ A are insignificantly different from zero, while for all regressions based on Eq. (14), the estimates of λ B are all significant at the 1% significance level. Together, these results support the hypothesis that the Bloomberg model fits the data better than any of the statistical-based forecasting models and provide supporting evidence that analyst forecasts serve an important role in the futures price discovery process.
Consensus versus alternative weighted analyst forecasts
As described earlier, the Bloomberg consensus forecast for any given week is computed as a simple, or equally weighted average of the individual analyst forecasts for that week. Given the large cross-sectional differences in analyst performance as reported in Table 2 , we ask the following question. When forming expectations regarding the pending storage announcement, does the market rely simply on the reported consensus analyst forecast, or alternatively, does the market when forming expectations look through the consensus estimate and assign differential weights to the individual analyst forecasts according to prior analyst performance? To investigate this issue, we consider a number of alternative weighting schemes based on both short-term and long-term performance considerations. Then, following the previous employed procedures, we examine the overall forecasting accuracy of these weighted schemes and investigate the extent to which the market may be incorporating such alternative weighting schemes into expectations.
Alternative weighting schemes
In the first three models, we assume that each week the market assigns weights to the individual analyst forecasts based on analyst short-term performance, i.e., during the immediate prior week.
(i) TopAnal_1w: In this scheme, we assume the market when forming expectations identifies the "top analyst" having the best forecast in the immediate prior week and then conditions on this same analyst's current week forecast (that is, the market assigns the forecast a 100% weight). The analyst tracked in this strategy thus typically changes each week according to who has the current "hot hand".
(ii) SAFE_1w: We assume that the market assigns weights to the current week set of forecasts according to the analysts' standardized absolute forecast errors (SAFE) from the immediate prior week. The weights are such that better performing analysts (e.g., those with lower values of SAFE) receive higher weights. Specifically, the weights are calculated as follows: 
where J t is the number of the analysts forecasting in week t who also forecasted in week t-1, SAFE j,t-1 is analyst j's standardized absolute forecast error during week t-1, and SAFE_1w j,t is the weight assigned to analyst j during week t.
(iii) ACCUR_1w: In this scenario we assume that the market assigns weights to the current week set of forecasts according to analysts' scaled accuracy measures (ACCUR) from the immediate prior week. The weights are such that better performing analysts (e.g., those with higher values of ACCUR) receive higher weights. Specifically, the weights are calculated according to:
where ACCUR j,t-1 is analyst j's scaled analyst accuracy measure (ACCUR) during week t-1, and
ACCUR_1w j,t is the weight assigned to analyst j during week t.
In the next four models we assume that the market assigns and updates weights each week according to the analysts' long-term forecasting performance based on the complete forecasting history of each analyst.
(iv) SAFE_Aw: In this model we assume that the market assigns weights each week calculated according to Eq. (15), but using instead each analyst's historical average SAFE performance that is based on all weeks of SAFE values available to date (e.g., , 1 j t SAFE − ).
(v) ACCUR_Aw: We assume that the market assigns weights calculated according to Eq.
(16), but using instead each analyst's historical average ACCUR performance that is based on all weeks of ACCUR values available to date (e.g., , 1 j t ACCUR − ).
(vi) SAFE_100: We assume that the market each week assigns a 100% weight to the single analyst having the lowest average weekly SAFE value as measured to date.
(vii) ACCUR_100: We assume that each week the market assigns a 100% weight to the single analyst having the highest average weekly ACCUR value as measured to date.
Mean squared error comparisons
For each alternative scheme for weighting analyst forecasts, we compute the resulting times series of implied storage forecasts and corresponding forecast errors. Then for each time series of forecast errors, we calculate the mean forecast error (both ME and the standardized SME), the mean absolute error (MAE and SMAE) and the root mean squared error (RMSE and SRMSE).
We report these values in Panel A of Table 7 . For purposes of comparison, we also provide the earlier reported statistics associated with the Bloomberg consensus forecast.
Again using the Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) pair-wise test procedure, we compare the mean squared error of the Bloomberg consensus forecast with those based on each of the weighted analyst forecast schemes. We present these results in Panel B of Table 7 . Recall that for the SMSE of one model (e.g., Bloomberg) to be statistically lower than that of an alternative paired model, we require that estimates of the coefficients ω i,1 and ω i,2 both be non-negative, and that at least one estimate be significantly positive, based on a one-tailed t-test. If both estimates are positive, then a Wald test for joint significance is conducted. To conclude that the alternative paired model had a lower SMSE than that of the Bloomberg forecast, we should observe that neither estimate of ω i,1 and ω i,2 is significantly positive and that at least one of the estimates is statistically negative. If both estimates are negative, then again a Wald test is conducted.
Consider first the comparison of the Bloomberg forecast errors with those based on each of the three short-term performance weighting schemes. For the TopAnal_1w comparison, the estimate of ω i,1 is negative, but insignificant, while the estimate of ω i,2 is significantly positive indicating that the Bloomberg MSE is lower. It appears that a strategy of following the analyst with the "hot hand" would have ignored information contained in the forecasts of the other analysts. For the other two short-term performance-weighting schemes (SAFE_1w and ACCUR_1w), no differences in the MSE errors is observed as both the coefficient estimates and the Wald statistics are insignificant. Together, these observations suggest that the Bloomberg consensus forecast is at least as good as forecasts based on the three short-term weighting schemes.
Comparing, however, the Bloomberg forecast errors with those based on the long-term performance weighting schemes, none of the estimates of ω i,1 are significantly positive, while estimates of ω i,2 for three of the four models are significantly negative (SAFE_100 being the exception). We conclude that mean square errors based of the three models SAFE_Aw, ACCUR_Aw, and ACCUR_100 are lower than that of the Bloomberg consensus forecast.
Analysis of futures price reaction
Using the alternative weighting scheme forecasts as market conditioning variables, we next conduct estimations of Eq. (9) after first standardizing all variables (except dummy variables) by actual storage levels. We present the results in Table 8 . For purpose of comparison, the earlier presented results based on the Bloomberg consensus forecast ("Bloomberg") are presented in the first column of Table 8 . As a general observation, the results across the various regressions are consistent. To illustrate, consider first the estimates of the various γ coefficients on the expected forecast variables. Consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, each of the estimated γ coefficients is insignificant in all regression models.
Second, consider the various β coefficients. The estimates of β 0 , β 2 , β 3 , and the sum β 0 +β 3 are all similar in sign as predicted and all are significant. However, there do appear to be differences in the magnitude of these response coefficients when comparing the Bloomberg results particularly with those results based on the two long-term weighting schemes SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100. Consider β 0 , the coefficient that captures the incremental market reaction per one percent of unexpected storage change during the EIA, injection season base case period. For Bloomberg, the estimated coefficient is -1.3617 (t-value -5.79) while for SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100 the values are -1.5782 (t-value -6.53) and -1.8047 (t-value -6.24), respectively.
Similarly, the estimated coefficients for β 2 and for β 3 for SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100 are the larger in magnitude than for Bloomberg and are again the largest overall.
Further, the reported values of total R 2 also appear larger for these two long-term weighting strategies SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100 (0.270 and 0.279, respectively) as compared to the Bloomberg regression value of 0.225. To further explore the relative explanatory power of the various regression specifications based on the alternative forecast weighting schemes as compared to that of the Bloomberg regression, we conduct the earlier described J-tests. Recall that for one model (say model A) to be said to fit the data better than a second paired model (say model B), we require the estimate of the coefficient on model A's fitted values (e.g., λ A in Eq. (13)) to be significantly different from zero, and the estimate of the coefficient on model B's fitted values (e.g., λ B in Eq. (14)) to be insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand, model B would be said to fit the data better than model A if the estimate of λ B is significant and that of λ A is insignificant. If both estimates are significantly different from zero, then both models provide a degree of information not found in the other, while if both estimates are insignificant, then both models provide similar information and neither model can be said to be superior to the other.
We present our J-test results in Panel A of Table 9 where the regression specifications in equations (13) and (14) are set up such that λ B is the estimated coefficient on the Bloomberg fitted value and λ A is the estimated coefficient on the paired alternative model. We find all estimates of λ A to be statistically significant while the estimates of λ B are statistically significant only when the Bloomberg model is paired with the TopAnal_1w and ACCUR_Aw models. For these two situations, we thus conclude that neither alternative model is superior to the Bloomberg model, and vise-versa. However, we can conclude the two short-term performance based models (SAFE_1W and ACCUR_1W) and the three long-term performance based models (SAFE_100 and SAFE_Aw, and ACCUR_100) all are superior to the Bloomberg model.
To further investigate the relative performance of each model, we expand our J-test analysis by repeating the tests but using all pair-wise model combinations involving the eight schemes for weighting analyst forecasts (Bloomberg and the seven alternative weighting schemes).
We present these results in Panel B for each pair-wise combination. Two columns of estimated coefficients on fitted values stand out in particular; these are for the specifications based on the weighting schemes SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100. All of the coefficients in each column are significant, typically at the 1 percent level. This indicates that the specifications based on these two weighting schemes provide a level of information beyond that contained in not only the model based on the Bloomberg consensus estimate but also those based on the other weighting schemes. Further, consider the results when these two models (see rows SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100) serve as basis for the X vector. In the case of ACCUR_100, only the fitted values for SAFE_100 and ACCUR_1w are significant. Similarly, for SAFE_100, only the fitted values for ACCUR_100 and ACCUR_1w are significant. Thus, with the exception of ACCUR_1w, none of the other models provides information beyond that of these two models.
Taken together, the above results strongly suggest that of the specifications tested, the ones based on the SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100 weighting schemes best fit the data. In other words, we find strong evidence that when forming expectations the market appears to look through the equally-weighted consensus forecast and assigns differential weights to the various analyst forecasts according to the prior forecast performance of the analysts. Furthermore, the market appears to assign little weight to the analyst with the "hot hand" who has simply demonstrated recent forecasting ability. Rather it appears that the market places significant weight on the analyst with the best long-term performance measured to date.
For the three weighting schemes in which 100 percent weights were placed on a single analysts: TopAnal_1w, SAFE_100, and ACCUR_100, we calculate the number of weeks during which the analyst being tracked changed. For TopAnal_1w, the analyst with the hot hand based on performance during the immediate prior week changed very frequently. For the 438 week sample period, changes were observed during 365 weeks and involved 37 of the 38 analysts. By comparison, for the SAFE_100 and ACCUR_100 weighting schemes based on cumulative performance as measured to each weekly date, there were few weekly changes and fewer analysts selected. For SAFE_100, there were 97 weeks during which the analyst changed involving 25 different analysts (13 analysts were never selected). For ACCUR_100, there were 122 analyst changes involving 21 different analysts (17 analysts were never selected).
Conclusion
Our research provides further insight into the important link between analysts and price discovery in markets in general, and, specifically in the case of natural gas futures prices. Price discovery is one of the most important roles served by futures markets. Black (1976) in fact states that facilitating price discovery is the most important benefit of futures markets, even exceeding that of risk transference. Futures markets facilitate price discovery by providing an open forum for the assimilation of information held by various market agents regarding both current and prospective supply and demand.
We explore the contribution of gas analysts in providing information to the market regarding the supply of storage and ultimately in facilitating price discovery in the natural gas futures contract. We find strong evidence that gas analysts assist in the discovery of futures prices by providing information beyond that contained in a number of statistical-based forecasts. Further, our evidence indicates that the market conditions expectations regarding a key weekly storage report on analyst forecasts and places greater emphasis on those of lead analysts having demonstrated superior long-term forecasting performance.
Appendix: The organizational structure of the gas storage market and the weekly storage survey
A.1. Storage facilities
Natural gas is stored underground in three primary facilities: aquifers, salt storage caverns, and depleted oil and gas reservoirs. There are approximately 407 facilities in the U.S. controlled by about 120 operators representing pipeline and local distribution companies, and independent storage service providers. 13 Gas held in storage facilities is denoted as either working or base gas.
Base (or cushion) gas is the amount necessary for ensuring the integrity of the storage facility so that adequate pressure is maintained and deliverability rates are ensured during withdrawal. Base gas volumes are relatively constant throughout the year. Working gas, the subject of our analysis, refers to those quantities held in excess of the base gas and that are used to satisfy withdrawal needs, are highly cyclical with inventories typically increasing from April to October ("injection season") and declining from November to March ("withdrawal season").
For survey purposes, storage facilities are classified into three geographic regions based on similarities in the way that gas is consumed and produced. These designations were originally used by the AGA and have continued to be used by the EIA. The three regions include: (a) the Producing Region ("Producing"), which includes Texas, Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, New
Mexico, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama; (b) the Consuming Region West ("Western"), which includes all states west of the Mississippi River less the Producing Region, Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri; and (c) the Consuming Region East ("Eastern"), which includes all states east of the Mississippi River less Mississippi and Alabama plus Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri.
A.2. AGA survey methodology
In January 1994, the AGA began publishing a weekly estimate of the working gas held in U.S.
storage facilities in response to the market's need for accurate and timely information. The estimate was produced as follows. Each week the AGA requested a sample of voluntarily reporting pool operators to provide two numbers: the "actual volume" of working gas in their pools, and the "maximum volume" that the same pools had held at anytime since 1992 (to proxy for the potential full quantity of the storage pool). The volumes were measured as of 9:00am
Eastern Time ("ET") Friday and submitted to the AGA by Tuesday.
13 Susmel and Thompson (1997) discuss structural changes in the natural gas market resulting from the regulatory changes of the 1980s and early 1990s and analyze various pricing implications. Further discussion of the economics of natural gas storage can be found in Hopper (2002) and De Jong and Walet (2003) .
For each region, the AGA totaled the reported volumes and divided this by the sum of the corresponding maximum volumes. This result produced a "sample percent full" statistic for the region. This statistic was then used to produce a regional estimate that would account for both the non-sampled and non-reporting storage operators. The regional estimate was computed by multiplying the "sample percent full" statistic by the "regional estimate of full." This process was repeated for each of the three regions and the three regional estimates were then summed to produce the national estimate. 14 The AGA released its report to the public on Wednesdays. Prior 
A.4. EIA survey methodology
The EIA modified both the survey and computational methodologies upon its takeover. The EIA requested that respondents use Form EIA-912 to submit working gas volumes (again measured as of 9:00am ET Friday) by 5:00pm ET the following Monday. Respondents were chosen from those operators required to submit Form EIA-191, a form which the EIA requires all operators of natural gas storage fields to submit on a month-end basis (this form asks for both working and base gas storage volumes). Two operators from the Eastern Region and three from the Producing Region were identified as showing no variation in inventories for the preceding two years. Thus, their inventories were considered as "constant" volumes. For the remaining operators in each region, a stratified sample was selected so as to achieve a target standard error of the estimate of working gas that was no greater than 5 percent. The EIA reported that this new sample expanded coverage over that of the AGA from about 84 to 91 percent overall.
The weekly EIA regional estimate is computed as the sum of two components: a variable component and the above mentioned "constant" volume. The variable component is computed by first summing the holdings of all respondents and then multiplying this total by an "expansion factor," which is used to account for the storage volumes held by non-sampled operators. The expansion factor is the ratio of the total working gas holdings of all operators in a given region (based on Form EIA-191 filings) divided by the total holdings of the selected stratified sample of operators from that region. The regional estimates are summed to produce the national estimate, which together are publicly released on Thursdays on the EIA web site.
The EIA further modified its procedures with the release of the October 30, 2003 report.
The sample was expanded from 44 to 55 operators thus again raising the percentages of sampled volumes. Also, surveyed operators were partitioned into two groups to better account for the nonsampled storage volumes: Group 1: those operators that would have a role in estimating nonsampled operator volumes, and Group 2: a base group that would not have a role. An expansion ratio is computed using procedures described above, but tailored to apply to only the volumes reported by the Group 1 operators. The weekly regional estimate is then calculated as the sum of three components: Group 1 Volume * Expansion Ratio + Group 2 Volume + K where K is the "constant" volume of those operators deemed to exhibit no variation in volume. The following alternative models to forecast the expected weekly storage change are used: (1) Bloomberg: The market expects the storage change to equal that of the Bloomberg forecasted change. (2) Naive0: The market expects no change in storage from that of the previous week. (3) Naive1W: The market expects the storage change to equal that change observed during the immediate prior week. (4) Naive1Y: The market expects the storage change to equal the previous-year, same-week change. (5) Naive5Y: The market expects the storage change to equal the previous 5-year, same-week average change. (6) ARIMA: The market expects the storage change to equal the out-of-sample ARIMA forecast. The root mean squared error (RMSE), the mean error (ME), and mean absolute error (MAE) of each model are based on differences between actual reported and forecasted values in Bcf, and the respective standardized statistics (SRMSE, SME, and SMAE) for the errors are scaled by the actual weekly storage levels.
Measure
Model 1 Bloomberg
Model 2 Naive0
Model 3 Naive1W
Model 4 Naive1Y
Model 5 Naive5Y Panel B. This panel presents results from tests of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the mean square error of the standardized forecast (SMSE) of Bloomberg and that of an alternative forecast model versus the alternative hypothesis that the Bloomberg SMSE is lower. Estimated is the following equation using forecast errors taken from the pair of models being compared: (FE i,t -FE B,t ) = ω i,1 + ω i,2 * [(FE i,t + FE B,t ) -(ME i + ME B )] + ε t , where FE B,t is the standardized forecast error based on the Bloomberg forecast during week t, FE i,t is the standardized forecast error taken from an alternative model i during week t, and ME B and ME i are the standardized mean forecast errors for Bloomberg and the alternative model i. The null hypothesis requires that the estimates of coefficients ω i,1 and ω i,2 both be equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis requires that both estimates are nonnegative and at least one is significantly positive based on a one-tailed t-test. If both coefficients are positive then the alternative hypothesis requires that the Wald-test statistic (for ω i,1 and ω i,2 being jointly equal to zero) be significant after the usual two-tail Chi-Square p-value is divided by 2. Estimates of ω i,1 and ω i,2 are presented along with their associated t-statistics in parentheses. Regression estimates have been corrected for autocorrelation and also for heteroscedasticity using the "jackknife" heteroscedastic consistent-covariance matrix estimator method (HCCME)). Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Bloomberg vs.
Model 2 Naive0
Model 4 Naive1Y
Model 5 Naive5Y This table presents AR corrected, GARCH(1,1) results using the following alternative models to forecast the expected weekly storage change: (1) Bloomberg: The market expects the storage change to equal that of the Bloomberg forecasted change. (2) Naive0: The market expects no change in storage from that of the previous week. (3) Naive1W: The market expects the storage change to equal that change observed during the immediate prior week. (4) Naive1Y: The market expects the storage change to equal the previous-year, same-week change. (5) Naive5Y: The market expects the storage change to equal the previous-5-year, same-week average change. (6) ARIMA: The market expects the storage change to equal the out-of-sample ARIMA forecast. The dependent variable is the percentage change in the natural gas futures prices around the storage report release. Other explanatory variables are as follows: Surprise is the difference between the actual and the expected weekly storage change. AgaBus t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the storage report was released during the AGA period business hour era, and is equal to 0 otherwise. AgaOff t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the report was released during off-business hours, and is equal to 0 otherwise. SeasWd t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the report was released during the withdrawal season, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables except dummies are standardized by the actual weekly storage levels. t-values are listed in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10% (all tests are two-sided except β 0 +β 3 < = 0, which is one sided).
Explanatory Variables
Model 1 Bloomberg
Model 2 Naive0
Model 4 Naive1Y
Model 5 Naive5Y for Bloomberg and an alternative model calculated using coefficient estimates from Table 5 . The null hypothesis requires that the estimates of both coefficients λ Α and λ Β be either simultaneously significant or insignificant. The alternative hypothesis requires that only one is significant based on a one-tailed t-test. AR corrected, GARCH(1,1) estimates of λ Α and λ Β along with their associated t-statistics are presented below. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%. t-values are listed in parentheses.
Bloomberg vs.
Model 2 Naive0
Model 4 Naive1Y
Model 5 Naive5Y The following alternative weighting schemes models for estimating the expected weekly storage change are used: (2) TopAnal_1w: The market expects that the storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who was most precise the previous week. (3) SAFE_1w: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their SAFE during the immediate prior week. (4) ACCUR_1w: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their ACCUR during the immediate prior week. (5) SAFE_Aw: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their historical average SAFE in the immediate prior week. 6) ACCUR_Aw: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their historical average ACCUR in the immediate prior week. (7) SAFE_100: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who had the lowest historical average SAFE in the immediate prior week. 8) ACCUR_100: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who had the highest historical average ACCUR in the immediate prior week. The root mean squared error (RMSE), the mean error (ME), and mean absolute error (MAE) of each model based on differences between actual reported and forecasted values in Bcf, and the respective standardized statistics (SRMSE, SME, and SMAE) for the errors are scaled by the actual weekly storage levels. Panel B. This panel presents results from tests of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the mean square error of the standardized forecast (SMSE) of Bloomberg and that of an alternative weighting scheme versus the alternative hypothesis that the Bloomberg SMSE is lower. Estimated is the following equation using forecast errors taken from the pair of models being compared: (FE i,t -FE B,t ) = ω i,1 + ω i,2 * [(FE i,t + FE B,t ) -(ME i + ME B )] + ε t , where FE B,t is the standardized forecast error based on the Bloomberg forecast during week t, FE i,t is the standardized forecast error taken from an alternative weighting scheme i during week t, and ME B and ME i are the standardized mean forecast errors for Bloomberg and the alternative weighting scheme i. The null hypothesis requires that the estimates of coefficients ω i,1 and ω i,2 both be equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis requires that both estimates are nonnegative and at least one is significantly positive based on a one-tailed t-test. If both coefficients are positive then the alternative hypothesis requires that the Wald-test statistic (for ω i,1 and ω i,2 being jointly equal to zero) be significant after the usual two-tail Chi-Square p-value is divided by 2. Estimates of ω i,1 and ω i,2 are presented along with their associated t-statistics in parentheses. Regression estimates have been corrected for autocorrelation and also for heteroscedasticity using the "jackknife" heteroscedastic consistent-covariance matrix estimator method (HCCME)). Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%. This table presents AR corrected, GARCH(1,1) results using the following alternative weighting schemes models for estimating the expected weekly storage change in Eq. (11): (1) Bloomberg: The market expects the weekly storage change to equal that of the Bloomberg forecasted change. (2) TopAnal_1w: The market expects that the storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who was most precise the previous week. (3) SAFE_1w: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their SAFE during the immediate prior week. (4) ACCUR_1w: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their ACCUR during the immediate prior week. (5) SAFE_Aw: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their historical average SAFE in the immediate prior week. 6) ACCUR_Aw: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be equal to the weighted average of the analyst forecasts based on their historical average ACCUR in the immediate prior week. (7) SAFE_100: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who had the lowest historical average SAFE in the immediate prior week. 8) ACCUR_100: The market expects that the weekly storage change will be the same as predicted by the analyst who had the highest historical average ACCUR in the immediate prior week. Other explanatory variables are as follows: Surprise is the difference between the actual and the expected weekly storage change. AgaBus t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the survey report was released during the AGA period business hour era, and is equal to 0 otherwise. AgaOff t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the survey report was released during off-business hours, and is equal to 0 otherwise. SeasWd t is a dummy variable with value 1 if the survey report was released during the withdrawal season, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables except dummies are standardized by the actual weekly storage levels. t-values are listed in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10% (all tests are two-sided except β 0 +β 3 < = 0 which is one sided).
Short
Short-term weighting schemes
Long-term weighting schemes Table 8 . AR-corrected, GARCH(1,1) estimates of regression coefficient λ Α for all combinations of the models are presented. The null hypothesis requires that for each pair of models (i, j) the estimates of both coefficients λ Α (row i and column j, and row j and column i) are either simultaneously significant or insignificant. The alternative hypothesis requires that only one is significant based on a one-tailed t-test. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
